In this paper, we develop a two-country monetary union new Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints, to be calibrated for Lithuania and the rest of the euro area.
Introduction
Lithuania lost its ability to set interest rates and conduct monetary policy since the decision to follow a …xed exchange rate regimes to the euro. Now being part of the euro area itself, the country is fully integrated in the system. This has crucial implications for the Lithuanian economy given that interestrate decisions are made in favor of the euro area as a whole, with Lithuania only a tiny part in the decision making. Furthermore, some of the speci…c characteristics of the housing market in Lithuania can result in the single monetary policy being transmitted in this economy in a way that is di¤erent than in other countries.
There are some particularities in the Lithuanian housing markets that make it di¤erent from its euro area partners. One of these di¤erences is, for example, mortgage contracts. Housing loans (and loans to non-…nancial corporations, NFCs) in Lithuania are almost exclusively made at variable interest rates (which are set for …xed periods, e.g. of up to 1 year), which are quick to respond to changes in borrowing costs in the …nancial markets. 1 In the beginning of 2013, about 70 per cent of new loans to households were issued at ‡exible interest rates. In 2014 and 2015, the proportion increased to more than 80 per cent (in 2015 the share of ‡exible rate loans, for both households and NFCs, reached 90 per cent). 2 In the big countries of the euro area, however, the majority of of households take mortgages at a …xed rate. 3 For France and Germany the ratio of ‡exible-rate loans is pretty low, around 12 per cent and 15 per cent respectively, while in Spain reaches 82 per cent. This high heterogeneity is re ‡ected in an average percentage of ‡exible-rate mortgage in the euro area of 45 per cent (the correspective percentage of …xed-rate loans is therefore 55 per cent).
Another issue of concern, now that Lithuania is part of the euro area, is how to correctly implement 1 See Karmaziene and Varanauskiene (2014) . 2 Data from the website of the Bank of Lithuania (Statistics). 3 See Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer (2014) on data from ECB. They report the share of ‡exible-rate mortgages among the oldest active mortgages related to the household main residence.
policies to promote …nancial stability, in accordance with the other members. The economy of Lithuania has su¤ered from the same …nancial stability problems stemming from the crisis as other countries. And as other economies, it has been trying to recover ever since and it has in fact fully recovered in terms of economic activity. The banking sector is, in any case, far better prepared to withstand such turbulences than in the outset of the most recent economic downturn. Recently, in the Financial Stability Review (Bank of Lithuania, 2015) , it has been stressed that despite the growth of domestic economy and the improvements in the …nancial health of the private sector, credit activity remained subdued in 2014 and in the …rst half of 2015. However, irrespective of the better preparedness of the banking sector to withstand shocks, the overall conditions remain challenging. It is of utmost importance that the banking sector is not only capable of absorbing the previous shocks, but is also adequately prepared to face any new systemic risks and ensure su¢ cient credit availability for the real sector under the least favourable conditions. Lithuania, as a new member of the euro area, has to implement its macroprudential policies in the context of this new economic setting, by interacting with the other monetary union members, that indeed share the same monetary policy. The Bank of Lithuania pursues macroprudential policy at the national level and monitors, assesses, and does its best to limit the macroprudential risk for the stability of the domestic …nancial system; in doing so it has the possibility to cooperate with the ECB and other national and international institutions. One of the intermediate objectives that the Bank of Lithuania has set is to mitigate excessive credit growth and too high leverage.
In this paper, we aim …rst at illustrating the monetary policy transmission in Lithuania in the context of the euro area. Then, we propose the implementation of a macroprudential tool, based on the LTV 4 , that aims at maximizing welfare. 5 The basic modelling setup constitutes a two-country new Keynesian DSGE model with …nancial frictions. In each country, there is a group of individuals that are credit constrained and need housing collateral to obtain loans. Countries trade goods, and savers in each country have access to foreign assets. Within this setting, we study how macroprudential policies should be conducted in Lithuania, in the context of the euro area. As a macroprudential tool, we propose 4 In our model, the LTV ratio will be calibrated to match the average (market) LTV in steady state. However the market LTV can vary depending on economic conditions and it may be di¤erent with respect to the imposed LTV cap set by authority. When the LTV cap is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint in this model is binding, borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. 5 Here we follow Angelini et al. (2014) in which they assume that the loss function in the economy also contains …nancial variables. Therefore, we use it as a proxy for …nancial stability, which is seen as the actual aim of macroprudential policy (Galati and Moessner, 2011 ). a decentralized Taylor-type rule for the LTV which responds to national deviations in credit from its steady state. We also include the common monetary policy with a Taylor rule, consistent with the ECB target of price stability, with interest-rate smoothing for interest-rate setting by a single central bank.
Results show that common shocks are transmitted in a stronger way in Lithuania than in the rest of the euro area, given that the former country has variable-rate mortgages and a higher LTV cap than its European partners. With respect to macroprudential policies, we …nd that the optimal policy is that Lithuania may have a di¤erent intensity in its LTV setting than the rest of the euro area, given that monetary policy is more e¤ective in this country. We also …nd that the LTV rule is welfare enhancing for the whole monetary union, although there exists a welfare trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers. This is explained because, on the one hand, macroprudential policies bring a more stable …nancial system, on the other hand, monetary policy may be less e¤ective and in ‡ation volatility can increase.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 bre ‡y adresses our main contribution, linking it to the recent literature, section 3 describes the model, section 4 presents the parameter values, section 5 presents the dynamics of the model, section 6 analyzes optimal macroprudential policies and section 7 concludes.
Literature review and our contribution
This paper relates to this policy making issue linking it to di¤erent strands of the literature. There is an extensive literature that shows that institutional, consumption, …nancial or housing market heterogeneity can endanger the optimality of EMU as a currency area (See Maclennan et al., 1998; ECB, 2009; Rubio, 2014) . The model constitutes a two-country version of the seminal paper of Iacoviello (2005) , that introduces a …nancial accelerator that works through the housing sector, in the ‡avor of Aspachs and Rabanal (2010). However, it introduces cross-country housing-market heterogeneity as in Rubio (2014) . This paper is also related to the recent literature on macroprudential and monetary policies in Iacoviello-type models such in the aforementioned Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012) or Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2013, 2014) . However, it explores the issue in a two-country setting as in BrzozaBrzezina et al. (2015) . The novelty of this paper is its special application to the case of Lithuania in a 2 countries framework with respect to the rest of the euro area. There is also some literature looking at the response of the Lithuanian economy to a common ECB rate shock. In particular, Stak· enas and Stasiukynait· e (2016), through an empirical structural VAR, look at the responses of GDP, HICP (excl. energy) and credit to non-…nancial institutions and households in Lithuania (and to GDP and HICP only for the euro area) due to a 100 bp increase in the Euribor. Their results are in line with some previous studies such as Georgiadis (2015) and Errit and Uuskula (2014) concluding that the response to a monetary policy shock coming from the euro area is quite substancial.
Model Setup
We consider an in…nite-horizon, two-country economy inside a monetary union. The home country is denoted by LIT and the rest of the union by EUR. Households consume, work, and demand real estate.
There is a …nancial intermediary in each country that provides mortgages and accepts deposits from consumers. Each country produces one di¤erentiated intermediate good, but households consume goods from both countries. For simplicity, housing is a non-traded good. We assume that labor is immobile across the countries. 6 Firms follow a standard Calvo problem (after Calvo, 1983) . In this economy, both countries. Analogous to the setting of the interest rate, there is a rule for the setting of the LTV, which serves as a macroprudential measure. We allow for housing-market heterogeneity across the countries.
The Consumer' s Problem
There are three types of consumers in each country: unconstrained consumers, constrained consumers who borrow at a variable rate, and constrained consumers who borrow at a …xed rate. The proportion of each type of borrower is …xed and exogenous. 7 Consumers can be constrained or unconstrained in the sense that constrained individuals need to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from the …nancial intermediary. Interest payments in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the future value of the current house stock. In this way, the …nancial intermediary ensures that borrowers are going to be able to ful…ll their debt obligations in the next period. As in Iacoviello (2005) , We assume that constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones. 8 There is a …nancial intermediary in each country. The …nancial intermediary in each country accepts deposits from domestic savers, and it extends both …xed-and variable-rate loans to domestic borrowers.
Unconstrained Consumers (Savers)
Unconstrained consumers in LIT maximize as follows:
Here, E 0 is the expectation operator, 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor for savers, and C u t , H u t , and L u t are consumption at t, the stock of housing, and hours worked, respectively. j represents the weight of housing in the utility function. 1= ( 1) is the aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
Consumption is a bundle of domestically and foreign-produced goods, de…ned as:
where n is the size of LIT.
The budget constraint for LIT is as follows:
Dividing by P LIT t , we can rewrite the budget constraint in terms of goods LIT 9 :
where LIT t denotes in ‡ation for the goods produced in LIT, de…ned as P LIT t =P LIT t 1 :
Maximizing (1) subject to (3) ; we obtain the …rst-order conditions for the unconstrained group:
Equation (4) equates the marginal rate of substitution between goods to the relative price. Equation (5) is the Euler equation for consumption. Equation (6) is the …rst-order condition for net foreign assets.
Equation (7) is the labor-supply condition. These equations are standard. Equation (8) is the Euler equation for housing and states that at the margin the bene…ts from consuming housing have to be equal to the costs.
Combining (5) and (6) we obtain a non-arbitrage condition between home and foreign bonds: 10
Since all consumption goods are traded and there are no barriers to trade, we assume in this paper 9 The variables in small letters are taken divided by PLIT t: 1 0 The log-linearized version of this equation could be interpreted as the uncovered interest-rate parity.
that the law of one price holds:
where variables with a star denote foreign variables and P LIT t is the foreign price of goods produced at home.
Constrained Consumers (Borrowers)
Constrained consumers in LIT are of two types: those who borrow at a variable rate and those who do so at a …xed rate. The di¤erence between them is the interest rate they are charged. The variablerate constrained consumer faces R LIT t , which will coincide with the rate set by the central bank. The …xed-rate borrower pays R LIT t , derived from the …nancial intermediary's problem. The proportion of variable-rate consumers in LIT is constant and exogenous and is equal to LIT 2 [0; 1].
Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, that is e < in terms of discount factors for borrowers and savers respectively. Constrained consumers face a collateral constraint: the expected debt repayment in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the expectation of tomorrow's value of today's stock of housing:
where equations (11) and (12) represent the collateral constraint for the variable-and …xed-rate borrower, respectively. k LIT t can be interpreted as the loan-to-value ratio in LIT. Notice that such models with collateral constraints, the LTV is typically considered exogenous. At the macroeconomic level, LTVs partly depend on exogenous factors such as regulation. This parameter is usually calibrated to match the average (market) LTV in the country analyzed. 11 However, in this model, it can vary depending on economic conditions, as a macroprudential policy variable. 12 For the setting of the …xed interest 1 1 Due to data availability, we use the average new loans'LTV at origination. 1 2 It has to be taking into account that in reality, macroprudential LTV caps are not always binding. Even a stable LTV cap inherently has a countercyclical e¤ect as it is less binding after a crisis but is likely to become more binding as credit and housing prices pick up during the …nancial cycle (Matk · enait· e et al., 2016).
rate, R LIT t , we follow Rubio (2011). We assume that there a …nancial intermediary in each country that accepts deposits from savers and extends both …xed and variable-rate mortgages to borrowers. For the two types of mortgage to be o¤ered, the …xed-interest rate has to be such that the intermediary is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or …xed rate. R LIT t will be an aggregate interest rate that contains information on all the past …xed-interest rates associated with past debt. Each period, this aggregate interest rate is updated with a new …xed interest rate that is an average discount average of all future variable interest rates.
Without loss of generality, we present the problem for the variable-rate borrower since for the …xed rate it is symmetrical. Variable-rate borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
where C cv t = (C cv LIT t ) n (C cv EU Rt ) 1 n ; subject to the budget constraint (in terms of good LIT):
and subject to the collateral constraint (11) . Notice that variable-rate borrowers repay all debt every period and acquire new debt at the current new interest rate. This assumption implies that the interest rate on variable-rate mortgages is revised every period for the whole stock of debt and changed according to the policy rate. 13 To make the problem for …xed-rate borrowers symmetrical and analogous to existing models with borrowing constraints, we assume the same debt-repayment structure for this type of borrower. Obviously, …xed-rate contracts are not revised every period. However, to make the model more realistic, but still tractable, the …xed-interest rate will be such that a revised …xed rate will be applied only on new debt, keeping constant the interest rate applied to existing debt. In this way, we reconcile the structure of the model with the fact that …xed-rate contracts are long term.
The …rst-order conditions for these consumers are as follows:
These …rst-order conditions di¤er from those of unconstrained individuals. In the case of constrained consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint ( cv t ) appears in equations (16) and (18) . As in Iacoviello (2005) , the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that constrained individuals borrow the maximum amount they are allowed, and their saving is zero. The problem for consumers is analogous in country EUR.
Firms 3.2.1 Final-Goods Producers
In LIT, there is a continuum of …nal-goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function:
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
The total demand of intermediate-good z is given by Y LIT t (z) =
Y LIT t ; and the price index is
Intermediate-Goods Producers
The intermediate-goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005) , intermediate goods are produced according to the following production function:
where t represents technology. We assume that log t = log t 1 + u t , where is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and u t is a normally distributed shock to technology. LIT 2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor 14 . L c t is labor supplied by constrained consumers, de…ned as
The …rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following: 15
where X t is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.
The price-setting problem for the intermediate-goods producers is a standard Calvo-Yun case. An intermediate-goods producer sells goods at price P LIT t (z) ; and 1 is the probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price P OP T LIT t (z) solves the following:
The aggregate price level is given as follows:
Using (23) and (24) and log-linearizing, we can obtain the standard forward-looking Phillips curve 16 .
The …rm problem is similar in EUR.
Aggregate Variables and Market Clearing
Given LIT ; the fraction of variable-rate borrowers in LIT, we can de…ne aggregates across constrained consumers as the sum of variable-rate and …xed-rate aggregates, so that C c t LIT C cv t + (1 LIT ) C Therefore, economy-wide aggregates in LIT are
The aggregate supply 1 4 It can be seen as labor-income share and proxy for the di¤erences in debt to GDP. 1 5 Symmetry across …rms allows avoiding index z: 1 6 The Phillips curve is as the following:^ LIT t = ^ LIT t+1 e kxt + uLIT t,wherex is 1/real marginal cost and e k = [(1
of housing is …xed, so that market clearing requires H t H u t + H c t = H. 17 The market clearing condition for the …nal good in LIT is nY LIT t = nC LIT t + (1 n) C LIT t + 
Monetary Policy
The model closes with a Taylor rule, with interest-rate smoothing for interest-rate setting by a single central bank, 18
0 1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia.
(1 + ) measures the sensitivity of interest rates to current in ‡ation. " R;t is a white noise shock process with zero mean and variance 2 " . R is the interest rate in steady state. This rule is consistent with the primary objective of the ECB being price stability.
Macroprudential Policy
As an approximation for a macroprudential policy, we consider a Taylor-type rule for the loan-to-value ratio. In standard models, the LTV ratio is a …xed parameter which is not a¤ected by economic conditions. However, we can think of regulations of LTV ratios as a way to moderate credit booms. When the LTV (cap) ratio is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint here is binding, borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent research on macroprudential policies has proposed Taylor-type rules for the LTV ratio so that it reacts inversely to variables such that the growth rates of GDP, credit, the credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices. 19 We decided to make the rule more parsimonious allowing the LTV ratio to eract to borrowing. This will help for a further study on the interactions with monetary policy. These rules can be a simple illustration of how a macroprudential policy could work in practice. Here, we assume that there exists a macroprudential Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio, so that it responds to deviations of credit from its steady state. 20 We consider a decentralized macroprudential policy in which each country can implement its own rule:
where k SSLIT ; b LIT are the steady-state values for the loan-to-value ratio and borrowing in LIT. k LIT 0 measures the response of the loan-to-value to deviations of borrowing from its steady state. This kind of rule would be countercyclical, delivering a lower LTV ratio in credit booms, therefore restricting the credit in the economy.
Welfare Measure
In order to provide a measure for welfare, we numerically evaluate how cross-country asymmetries a¤ect welfare for a given policy rule and for technology shocks. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2012), the two approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation to the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we take this latter approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the three types of agents separately. 21 The individual welfare for savers and borrowers in LIT is de…ned, respectively, as follows:
We have also experimented with rules that react to output and house prices and results for the dynamics of the model are similar. The …rst variable would correspond to the objective of the macroprudential regulator to moderate booms in the economy that could lead to an excessive credit growth. Drehmann et al. (2010) also point out that the deviations of credit from its long-term trend are very good indicators of the increase in systemic risk, which is the macroprudential attention. As for the house prices, given collateral constraints, they are the key causal variable for the dynamics of loans to households, and it appears to correspond to the actual behavior of policymakers (Angelini et al., 2012) . 2 1 We used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order approximation to the constraints, then evaluating welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in SchmittGrohe and Uribe (2004) . See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous consumers.
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we de…ne social welfare in LIT as a weighted sum of the individual welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Borrowers and savers'welfare are weighted by 1 e and (1 ) ; respectively, so that the two groups receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream. Everything is symmetrical for EUR.
Total welfare is de…ned as a weighted sum of the welfare in the two countries:
In order to make the results more intuitive, we present welfare changes in terms of consumption equivalents. We use as a benchmark the welfare evaluated when the macroprudential policy is not active and compare it with the welfare obtained when such policy is implemented. 22 
Parameter Values
Parameters are calibrated to re ‡ect the economy of Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. Some of the parameters are standard and are common for both economies and some others will be speci…cally calibrated for each country. Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of the parameter values.
Discount factors are set to be common in both economies, following the standard values in the literature. The discount factor for savers, , is set to 0:99. 23 The discount factor for borrowers, e , is set to 0:98. 24 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0:12 and 0:14, in the euro area and Lithuania, respectively. This parameter pins down the ratio of housing wealth to GDP, since the latter in the steady state is a function of this parameter. 25 We set = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1: 26 For the loan-to-value ratio we consider a steady-state value of 0.68 and 0.78, for the euro area and Lithuania, respectively, taking the LTV ratio observed in the data. 27 The labor-income share of unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:7. 28 We pick a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. This value implies a steady-state markup of 1:2.
The probability of not changing prices, , is set to 0:75, implying that prices change every four quarters on average. For the Taylor rule parameters, we used = 0:8, = 0:5: The …rst value re ‡ects a realistic degree of interest-rate smoothing. 29 is consistent with the original parameters proposed by Taylor in 1993. We consider , the proportion of variable-rate mortgages, to be 0.45 and 0.82, in the euro area and Lithuania, respectively. The size of Lithuania is considered to be 0.35%. 30 A technology shock was a 1
per cent positive technology with 0.9 persistence. 31 Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of the parameter values. 
Shock Transmission
In this section, we study …rst the dynamics of the model by showing impulse-responses to a monetary policy shock, a technology shock and a house price shock, abstracting from macroprudential policies, and using the parameter values shown in the previous section. Given the structural di¤erences between
Lithuania and the rest of the euro zone, the same monetary policy shock, coming from the ECB, is potentially going to be transmitted in a di¤erent way in Lithuania. Other shocks, i.e. technology and housing demand, even if they are common, will have a di¤erent impact on the two economies and will have to be accommodated by the single monetary policy. Figure 1 presents impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. This represents a decrease in the interest rate by the ECB. The common monetary policy shock is transmitted to both economies in a di¤erent way. Although the e¤ects on house prices and in ‡ation are very similar for Lithuania and the rest of the euro area, the e¤ects on borrowing di¤er. In particular, we see that in Lithuania the increase in borrowing is stronger than in the rest of the euro area. Lithuania is an economy in which rates are variable, as opposed to the big countries of the EMU. Therefore, the same drop in the policy rate is transmitted in a direct way to the borrowing rate, causing credit to increase sharply. On the other hand, the LTV in Lithuania is also larger than in the rest of the euro area. This creates a higher …nancial accelerator and thus, the same change in the interest rate and house prices a¤ect the collateral constraint by more, making borrowing more sensitive to monetary policy changes. This stronger increase in credit creates an extra increase in consumption demand in Lithuania.
Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock

Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock
When there is a common technology shock, demand increases in a similar way in both countries ( Figure   2 ). In the same way, in ‡ation decreases both in LIT and EUR and reduces the interest rate. The main di¤erence comes in the …nancial side. Given that Lithuania has a higher LTV than the rest of the Euro area and the interest rate is variable, borrowing increases by more in Lithuania following the fall in the common policy rate. As in the previous case, the increase of mortgaged houses is higher in Lithuania.
For this kind of shock, we observe a slightly larger increase in house prices in Lithuania, with respect to the rest of the euro area. Figure 3 describes impulse responses to a house price shock both in Lithuania and in the rest of the euro area. We see from the …gure that the house price shock is stronger in Lithuania and this causes credit to increase by more in this country. This creates strong e¤ects on mortgaged houses and on consumption.
Impulse Responses to a House Price Shock
In the rest of the euro area, the e¤ects are similar but weaker. 
Optimal Macroprudential Policy
In this section, we search for the optimal macroprudential policy, in the sense that it maximizes country's welfare. We assume that macroprudential policy is taken at a national level and that both countries take the ECB policy as given when deciding on their macroprudential policies. Table 3 presents the optimized parameters for the macroprudential rules, in particular the ones described in equations (26) and (27) . We take monetary policy as given and search over the parameters that maximize welfare in each country simultaneously. 32 
Optimal Parameters
0:7
The …rst row of Table 3 corresponds to the optimal macroprudential policy in the rest of the euro area. In the second row, Lithuania optimizes its macroprudential policy to maximize its welfare. 33 We Figure 3 : Impulse Responses to a House Price shock see that the optimal policy in Lithuania may have a di¤erent intensity compared to the rest of the euro area. This is maily due to the variable rates that predominate in Lithuania. In the rest of the euro area, with …xed rates, monetary policy is less e¤ective and macroprudential policies can compensate for this fact. Then, in Table 4 , using the optimal parameters just described above, we present the gains in terms of welfare (in consumption equivalents) that implementing this optimal rule represents. As in Ascari for the economy that would include not only the variability of output and in ‡ation but also the variability of borrowing: and Ropele (2009), we …nd the constant fraction of steady-state consumption that would have to be transferred to the agent if there were a welfare loss under the new parameterization. 34 Here, a positive value of consumption units represents a welfare increase, that is, how much the agent would pay in units of consumption in order to be better o¤. A negative value means that welfare was decreasing, that is, by how much an agent should be compensated in units of consumption. We take as a benchmark the case in which there are no macroprudential policies in place.
We can observe from Table 4 that macroprudential policies are welfare enhancing in both regions.
In models with collateral constraints, macroprudential policies deliver welfare gains because of the externality coming from the constraint. In this kind of models, the collateral constraint is always binding and, therefore, borrowers are not able to smooth consumption as savers do. Thus, a policy that enhances …nancial stability brings them a more stable scenario with a more stable consumption path. 35 However, as usual in this kind of models, there is a trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers. Savers are worse o¤ with macroprudential policy because, in this model, the sticky-price assumption is creating a distortion that a¤ects them. Since they are the owners of the …rms, ideally they would like to live in a world in which there is price stability, the goal of monetary policy. If monetary policy loses e¤ectiveness with the presence of macroprudential policies, savers may not like the latter ones 36 . In the aggregate, the economy bene…ts from macroprudential policies but the gain is coming from the borrower's side. Table 5 displays both macroeconomic and …nancial volatilities to help us understand where the welfare gains come from. We calculate the standard deviations for output, in ‡ation and borrowing for
Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. Our benchmark is the case in which there are no macroprudential policies in place (…rst column). Then, we see how these volatilities change when we consider the optimized parameters obtained in Table 3 (second column of Table 5 ). We can observe that, when the macroprudential policy is introduced, the economy bene…ts from a more stable economy, both in terms of output and borrowing. 37 This comes at the expense of larger volatility of in ‡ation in our model, because of the di¤erences that may arise between macroprudential and monetary policies, in the context of supply-side shocks. 38 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a two-country DSGE model with housing to study the implications of the entrance of Lithuania in the euro area. One of the countries is calibrated to re ‡ect the Lithuanian economy, while the other one represents the rest of the euro area.
First, we study how common shocks transmit in a di¤erent way in both regions. In particular, results show that common shocks (monetary policy, technology or house price shocks) are transmitted in a stronger way in Lithuania than in the rest of the euro area, given that the former country has variable-rate mortgages and a higher LTV ratio than its European partners. macroprudential policies as a rule for the (cap) LTV setting that responds to deviations of credit from its steady state. With respect to macroprudential policies, we …nd that the optimal policy is that Lithuania may have a di¤erent intensity in its LTV setting than the rest of the euro area, given that monetary policy is more e¤ective in this country. We also …nd that the LTV rule is welfare enhancing for the whole monetary union, although there exists a welfare trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers. This is explained because, on the one hand, macroprudential policies bring a more stable …nancial system but, on the other hand, monetary policy may be less e¤ective and in ‡ation volatility can increase.
